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STATE OF UTAH,

/
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/
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/

MICHAEL RENE DITTMER,

/

Case No. 980169-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal

from

a

final

order

finding

Appellant

guilty

of

burglary, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-6-202
U.C.A.

(1953)

as

amended;

theft,

a

Class

B

Misdemeanor,

in

violation of Section 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended; Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of
Section 58-37-8, U.C.A.

(1953) as amended; and violation of Drug

Paraphernalia Act, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section
58-37A-5(l) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, in the Second Judicial Court
in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael D.
Lyon, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

/

Plaintiff/Respondent

/

vs.

/

MICHAEL RENE DITTMER,

/

Case No. 980169-CA

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This

appeal

is

from

a

final

order

and

judgment

finding

Appellant guilty of one count of burglary, a Third Degree Felony,
in violation of U.C.A. Section 76-6-202 (1953, as amended); theft,
a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404 (U.C.A., as
amended);

possession

Misdemeanor,

of

in violation

a

controlled

of

U.C.A.

substance,

58-36-8

a

(U.C.A.

Class

B

1953, as

amended) ; and violation of a drug paraphernalia act, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-A-5(l) (U.C.A. 1953, as
amended) and sentencing Appellant to serve an undeterminent term
not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison on the felony
count and terms of 180 days on each misdemeanor count, to run
concurrent with each other.
to

Utah

Code

Ann.

Section

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
78-29-312(e)

(1996).

Appellant's

conviction was entered by Judge Baldwin on February 19, 1998.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did

the

defense

attorney

deny

Appellant's

right

to

effective assistance of counsel?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The Appellate Court must decide if the trial record is

adequate to permit decision of the issue and if the Defendant is
represented by counsel other than trial counsel.

Further, where

ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal, the Appellate Court must determine, as a matter of law,
whether the Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
State v. Callahan, 826 P.2d 590

(Utah App. 1993).

Appellant must

establish:
(a)

His counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness.
(b)

But for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different.

Defense counsel's failure cannot be deemed trial

strategy, in that there was no possible benefit for Appellant from
his failures.
(c)

That

represented

in

State v. Hovator, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah, 1996).
the
the

jury was

encouraged

photographs

were

to

speculate

stolen

or

the

that

items

product

Appellant's burglaries when in fact, Appellant was only

of

charged

with theft of a couch and a day planner.
(d)

That

defense

counsel

failed

to object

to the

State's

cross examination of Appellant as being beyond the scope of direct
and in violation of Rule 104 (d) Utah Rules of Evidence and that was

2

prejudicial to Defendant's case.
(e)

That defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to

object to the State's improperly presented and unsupported innuendo
in his opening statement and through witnesses, which provided the
jury a basis to impute criminal intent and actions to Defendant
which were not supported by any testimony in regard to property
with which Defendant was not charged, i.e. improper statements by
the State concerning property in Defendant's possession with which
he was not charged with theft or any other crime.
to support prejudicial, inculpatory
opening

statement

The State failed

inferences arising

and examination of witnesses with

from its

appropriate

evidence.
(f)

The standard of review as to the officer's

reasonable

suspicion and illegal detention of Appellant is two-fold.

(1) Was

the police officer's actions justified at its inception and (2) was
the

resulting

detention

reasonably

related

in

scope

to

the

circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?
(g)

The standard of review with regards to the admissibility

of the evidence of third party culpability, pursuant to Wigmore on
Evidence (1A Wigmore, Evidence (Tillers rev. ed. 1980) Section 139,
P. 1724), is that if the evidence is of no appreciable value, no
harm

is done

in admitting

it; but

if the evidence

is in

truth

calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the Court should not attempt
to decide for the jury that this doubt is purely speculative and
fantastic,

but

should

afford

the

create that doubt.

3

accused

every

opportunity

to

2.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Was the State's action when it improperly brought Appellant's
pre-Miranda
during

statements and silence to the attention of the jury

his

opening

statement

and

examination

of

witnesses

prosecutorial misconduct.
Standard of Review:

The standard concerning

prosecutorial

misconduct is whether prosecutor's statements constitute error and
were improper because the remarks called to the juror's attention
matters which they would not be justified in considering and in
reaching a verdict and were these remarks harmful, and should these
remarks have been an error that should have been obvious to the
trial Court?
(a)
presenting

Did

the prosecutor

(admitting)

commit prosecutorial

pre-Miranda

statements

misconduct

and

by

pre-Miranda

silence to establish the identification and theft of items with
which the Appellant was not charged.

The standard of review of

questions with regards to reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle
and detain is for corrections.

State v. Rodriguez, 338 Utah Adv.

Rep. 19, Utah Court of Appeal, March 3, 1998; and
(b)

Did prosecution commit reversible error by the use of

hearsay testimony to introduce unsupported innuendo to the jury in
his opening remarks and through witness testimony, which provided
the

jury a basis

to

imply

intent

and

actions

of

the

Appellant

(which were not supported by the facts) with regard to property
with which Appellant was not charged.

4

PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues that his trial counsel acted so deficiently
as to deny him a fair trial and but for the deficiency, the outcome
of the trial would have been different.
In addition, Appellant was faced with prosecutorial misconduct
which violated his due process rights under the Constitution of the
U.S. and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of this State and District
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which District shall
have been previously ascertained by law and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.
U.S.

(emphasis added)

Constitutional

Amendment

VI

in

U.S.

Constitutional

Amendment XIV, Section 1 provides all persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunity for the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without

due

process

of

law,

nor

deny

any

jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
5

person

within

(emphasis added)

its

Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 7 provides that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 12 provides that in criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him; to have a copy thereof; to testify on his
own behalf; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf; have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed and the right to appeal in all cases.

In no instance

shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights therein guaranteed.

The

accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense.

(emphasis added)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, possession of
a controlled substance and violation of the drug paraphernalia act
and was convicted on all four counts.

(R. 1-4) Defense counsel

failed to adequately investigate and prepare a defense on all four
charges.

He failed to investigate recent burglaries by third

parties of the storage units which Appellant was charged with
burglarizing.

He failed to file and/or argue suppression motions
6

concerning in custody statements made by the Appellant and repeated
to the jury in reference to a camper shell and miscellaneous
property with which Appellant was not charged and as to drugs and
paraphernal.

He failed to object to a witness' competence to

testify concerning practices and procedures with regards to the
storage

company's

activities

and

with

regards

to

witness'

inconsistent statements. He closed the defense without permission
of his client and without having called any witnesses or making any
opening statement whatsoever, which required the Appellant to take
the stand in his own defense after asking the Court if he, in fact,
could put on a defense. He failed to object to the foundation for
photographs

which

were

entered

into

evidence

and

contained

prejudicial information concerning apparently stolen property with
which the Appellant was not charged.
witnesses in the defenses behalf.

He failed to produce

He failed to object to the

State's cross-examination of the Appellant to such questions that
were clearly beyond the scope of direct examination. He failed to
object to the presentation by the State of unsupported innuendo in
opening arguments and in examination of witnesses.
object

and/or agree

that

the officers

at

He failed to

the scene had no

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's activities or search his
truck, and that the detention was not reasonable in scope as it
related to the circumstances of this case.

In addition, defense

counsel failed to investigate the case to discover evidence of
third party culpability as to the prior burglaries of the storage
units, whether anyone was under investigation for those crimes and
7

more importantly, was the modis operandi the same or similar to
acts of behavior of Appellant.
The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by admitting
pre-Miranda statements and pre-Miranda silence and by establishing
the identification and theft of items with which the Appellant was
not charged by the use of hearsay testimony only and by presenting
unsupported

innuendo

in his opening

remarks and through the

witnesses who were called to testify, which provided the jury a
basis to impute intent and actions of the Appellant that were not
supported by any testimony with regards to property with which the
Appellant was not charged. The State failed to support prejudicial
and inculpatory inferences arising from his opening arguments and
posed questions to witnesses and presented pictures and other
evidence of possible crimes with which Appellant was not charged.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 29, 1997, Appellant rented
a storage unit located at 1701 West Riverdale Road in Roy, Utah,
commonly known as Mollerup's Storage.

(R. 128-155) Appellant had

lost his apartment and was in the process of moving his personal
property into a unit during that day.
a.m., Appellant

(R. 128-142) At about 10:00

had occasion to visit a friend by the name of

Robert Amador at Amador's residence.

(R. 128-145)

After a few

hours, Appellant left Amador's residence and returned again about
3:00 p.m.

(R. 128-156)

The record does not disclose whether

Appellant was making additional moving trips to the storage unit
during his absence from Amador's home, but apparently he left and
8

returned again.

(R. 128-157 and 158)

At approximately

6:00 p.m. on the same day, Amador and

Appellant returned to the storage unit.

(R. 128-157)

Appellant

was delivering a load of property to his unit, but he needed to
sort out what he wanted to keep and what he wanted to take to the
swap meet.

(R. 128-142) As a result, he said he unloaded much of

this property from his truck.

(R. 128-142)

During this process,

Appellant and Amador discovered papers and property laying about
and inside some of the open storage units.
159)

(R. 128-143, 144 and

Appellant thought that this property had been abandoned and

would be taken to the dump or was otherwise left behind by the
owners.

(R. 128-152) Amador and Appellant proceeded to go through

the property that they had found to determine which items, if any,
could be sold at the swap meet.

(R. 128-145)

The two men found

such items as empty boxes, papers, motorcycle parts, printers,
(R. 128-144) , and in one open unit they found a broken washing
machine which appeared to have been abandoned.

(R. 128-143)

Appellant moved this machine into his unit hoping that it could be
restored.

(R. 128-143)

Amador and Appellant also came across a couch and a few boxes
of personal property that Appellant had noticed during his visit to
the storage units earlier that day. Appellant told Amador that if
he did not want the couch, Appellant would take it to the swap meet
and sell it.

(R. 128-144)

Solomon Le Doux arrived at Mollerup's to check on his two
rental units at approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening.
9

(R. 128-4

and 5)

As he approached his units to check his property, he saw

two men who he later identified as Appellant and Amador, who he
described to police as "suspicious".

(R. 128-4)

Mr. Le Doux

stated that he observed the Appellant removing items from storage
units and putting them into a greenish truck.

(R. 128-5)

This

witness testified that he did not see either man break into any
storage unit.

(R. 128-6)

In fact, Mr. Le Doux testified that the

units were not even locked.

(R. 128-9) Further, he testified that

he had observed the men for at least 15 minutes prior to the
arrival of the police.

(R. 128-13) Mr. Le Doux went on to testify

that his units had been burglarized about a week prior to March 29,
1997.

(R. 128-6)

Indeed, Detective Bryson of the Roy Police

Department later testified that there had been recent burglaries of
the units at that location.

(R. 128-131)

Neither the state nor

defense counsel bothered to verify this information to determine
whether or not someone else had recently committed burglaries on
the units in question and that they then had been abandoned, and
Appellant was just sifting through the rubble.

This could have

left an impression with the jury that Defendant had committed those
prior burglaries which was not a fact in evidence.
Mr.

Le

Doux

contacted

police

and

according

to Officer

Hackworth of the Roy City Police Department, Hackworth arrived at
the scene at about 6:00 p.m. that evening.
uniform and driving a marked police car.

Hackworth was in

(R. 128-18) Mr. Le Doux

talked with Hackworth about what he had observed and Hackworth
began questioning Appellant and Amador concerning their activities.
10

Appellant remained silent during most of this questioning, but
Amador, with Appellant present, did volunteer some information,
which was presented to the jury during Appellant's trial on the
matter. Appellant's silence during this questioning was made clear
to the jury by the State during State's opening statement
(R. 129-7) and the trial.

(R. 128-26, 31, 32 and 33)

not present at the trial, nor did he testify.

Amador was

Hackworth made it

clear to both men that they were not free to leave the scene and
escorted them from inside the building out into the light.
(R. 128-28 and 29)

About this time, Hackworth called for back up

and Officer Stevens of the Roy City Police Department arrived at
the scene, also in uniform and driving a marked police car.
(R.

128-34)

Shortly

thereafter,

Hackworth

discovered

that

Appellant had given false information concerning his name and date
of birth.

(R. 128-34)

If Appellant was not free to leave the

scene before Hackworth received this information, there should be
little doubt that he would not be free to leave after giving*false
information to a police officer.

Hackworth had probable cause to

arrest at that time and Appellant was "in custody".
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Detective Bryson of the Roy City
Police Department arrived at the scene.

At this time, there were

at least three police officers at the scene. Also present were Mr.
Le Doux, who had admitted Stevens to Mollerup's through the
security gate (R. 128-76), and the manager of Mollerup Storage (R.
128-126)

Clearly, Appellant was surrounded.

Bryson had been

contacted to report to the scene shortly after Hackworth determined
11

Appellant's true identity.

(R. 128-38 and 121)

Prior to Bryson's arrival and prior to any spoken arrest,
Stevens contacted Nicole Ayers, a renter of one of the units at the
scene.

He requested that she appear at the scene to identify any

personal property that may have belonged to her.

(R. 128-42) She

identified a couch on the Appellant's truck and a day planner that
were hers.

She testified that her shed had been locked and the

items were not abandoned.

Appellant's storage shed was in a

different area than hers.

After her identification of several

items, Appellant and Amador were placed under formal arrest by
Stevens.

Appellant was not informed of his Miranda rights by

anyone while he was at the scene.

In fact, he was not informed of

his Miranda rights until after he had been transported to the
office of Detective Bryson for a personal interview at the Roy
jail.

(R. 128-123)
It is unclear from the record when Appellant agreed to allow

the officers to enter and search his unit. From the transcript of
Hackworth's testimony, a person arrived at the scene looking for a
camper shell which matched the description of the one police said
was described by Appellant

(R. 128-38)

Defendant's attorney did

not attempt to exclude this testimony because Appellant was in
custody and had not been given his Miranda warnings.
surrounded

by

uniformed

police

and

on

lookers.

He was
Further,

information received from Talbot, the alleged owner of the shell,
was not objected

to.

Talbot did not appear or testify at

Appellant's trial.
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According

to Hackworth,

Appellant's consent.

Stevens

opened

the

truck

after

(R. 128-40) The officers testified that they

retrieved just enough information from the contents of the truck to
notify Nicole Ayers to report to the scene.

(R. 128-40)

With her

alleged identification, a formal arrest was made 3 0 to 45 minutes
after the officers entered the truck.

(R. 128-42)

Before this

time, the officers searched and interrogated Appellant under the
auspices of consent.
Incident to an

(R. 128-34, 39, 40)
"inventory

search" of Appellant's truck,

Stevens found what the state has referred to as a "hype kit"
containing a small spoon and film canisters.

(R. 128-95)

Stevens

interrogated Appellant about this item and Appellant stated that it
was his and that he was a drug user. Still, Appellant had not been
informed of his Miranda rights.

(R. 128-44)

The State did not

assert that this "hype kit" contained any illegal substances. The
officers also recovered a small amount of marijuana in Appellant's
pocket.

At Detective

Bryson's office, at least an hour after

Bryson arrived at the scene, Appellant was read his Miranda rights
from a card, but nothing during Detective Bryson's interview with
Appellant had much to do with drugs or stolen property.

The

interview revolved around a washing machine that was not part of
the state's case and was not connected to any of the charges
brought against Appellant.

Appellant waived his rights to Bryson

and consented to speak with her, but by then, the officers had
already received enough evidence from Appellant that Bryson did not
need to discuss any of the charges, only the washing machine, which
13

was not related to theft charges.

(R. 128-123-129)

Both Hackworth and Stevens were allowed to present Appellant's
statements concerning the "hype kit" to the jury during Appellant's
trial.

(R.

128-

44

and

95)

The

defense

failed

to

file

a

suppression motion or to even make an oral argument concerning the
inadmissibility of Appellant's statements made after

Appellant was

placed in custody and after his arrest, but before Miranda rights
were given.
Appellant was convicted on all four charges and subsequently
sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

(a)

Defendant's

attorney

failed

to

investigate

persons

charged with recent burglaries of Mollerup's Storage.
(b)
motions

Defense attorney failed to file and/or argue suppression
concerning

in custody

statements

made by Defendant

and

repeated to the jury in reference to the camper shell, couch and
miscellaneous property with which Appellant was not charged.
(c)

Defense counsel failed to object to Le Doux's competence

to testify
storage

concerning

company

practices

policies

and procedures

and

with

with

regards

to

regards

to

witnesses'

inconsistent statements.
(d)
any

Defendant's attorney closed the defense without calling

witnesses

or

consultation

with

his

client

which

forced

Appellant to ask the Court if he could testify to at least put on
some defense.

As a result, Appellant was forced
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to testify

in

violation

of

the

First

Amendment

to

the

U.S.

Constitution

incorporated into the 14th Amendment and thereby made applicable to
the State.
(e)

Defense counsel failed to demand a foundation before the

Court improperly admitted photos into evidence of items with which
Appellant was not charged that were highly prejudicial and allowed
the jury to speculate that these items represented in the photos
were stolen by Appellant when in fact, Appellant was only charged
with theft of a couch and day planner.
(f)
Talbot.

Defense

counsel

failed

to

produce

witnesses

such

as

Police said they knew she would, from time to time, go

through open units and collect property.
(g)

Defense

examination

of

counsel

Appellant,

failed

to

object

which

went

to

state's

beyond

scope

object

to

of

cross
direct

examination.
(h)

Defense

improperly

counsel

presented

and

failed

to

unsupported

innuendo

in

the

State's

his

opening

statement and through witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to
impute intent and actions to Defendant that were not supported by
any testimony with regards to property with which Defendant was not
charged, i.e. improper statements by the State concerning property
in Defendant's possession with which he was not charged with theft
or

any

other

inculpatory

crime.

inferences

The

State

arising

failed
from

his

to

support

opening

prejudicial,
statement

and

examination of witnesses with appropriate evidence.
(i)

Defense counsel failed to argue that the officers at the
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scene had no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's activities
and search his truck and that the detention was not reasonable in
scope as it related to the circumstances of the case.
(j)

Defense counsel failed to introduce any evidence of third

party culpability concerning prior burglaries of the storage unit,
the identification of prior criminal activity and by whom, together
with the fact that Appellant had no burglary tools, but were other
tools found or people charged in prior burglary.
2.

Prosecutorial Misconduct.

(a)

The

State

improperly

brought

Appellant's

pre-Miranda

statements and silence to the attention of the jury during his
opening statement and examination of witnesses.
(b)
shell

The State produced evidence of the theft of a camper

with which

Appellant

was

not

charged

information to the jury by way of hearsay.

and

brought

this

The State established

evidence of theft of camper shell by hearsay.
(c)

The State improperly presented unsupported innuendo in

his opening statement and through witnesses, which provided the
jury a basis to impute intent and actions to Defendant that were
not supported by any testimony with regards to property with which
Defendant was not charged, i.e. improper statements by the State
concerning property in Defendant's possession even though he was
not charged with theft of those items. The State failed to support
prejudicial,

inculpatory

inferences

arising

from

his

opening

statement and examination of witnesses' questions with appropriate
evidence.
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First, the State introduced testimony, without objection from
defense counsel, through Mr. Le Doux's testimony, as to the
practices and procedures of the storage unit management.

Mr. Le

Doux had nothing to do with the management or rental of the units
at Mollerup's, but only maintained

two rental units at the

facility. He testified that he was aware of the management policy
and procedures used when tenants failed to pay their rent in a
timely manner (R. 128-8), but went on to admit that his knowledge
came from the fact that his storage units were sealed by Mollerup
because he was delinquent in his rental payments and that he could
not gain access to those units as a result thereof.

(R. 128-9)

Mr. Le Doux also testified that his units had been burglarized a
week or so prior to March 29, 1997.
Defense counsel failed to adequately cross examine Le Doux as
to his inconsistent statements.

It was imperative that defense

counsel question Le Doux's competency to testify as to Mollerup's
procedures. The jury should have been made aware of the fact that
it appeared that Le Doux was locked out of his own rental units,
but justified his presence at the scene by stating that he, in
fact, got into his units to insure the safety of his property on
March 29, 1997.

(R. 128-13)

Further, defense counsel failed to

object to the absolute lack of foundation as to the witness'
personal knowledge of management practices and procedures dealing
with other tenants; reasons why storage units may have been left
open and policies and practices with regards to Mollerup's dealings
with abandoned property.

Neither the State nor defense counsel
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introduced any evidence concerning these things, even though the
manager of the facility was present on March 29, 1997 when the
police were at the scene and even though Detective Bryson knew the
manager's identity.

(R. 128-126)

In addition, while Mr. Le Doux observed Appellant for about 15
minutes prior to the arrival of the police, during which time
Appellant went on with his business, defense counsel failed to
object to Le Doux's speculation that Appellant had no reason to pay
attention to him.

(R. 128-13)

Defense counsel failed to inquire

as to the location of the witness and whether Appellant appeared to
know he was there and watching. The argument should have been made
that if Appellant was aware of the witness' observations, and
continued his activity, it is reasonable that Appellant felt his
activities innocent and therefore made no effort to hide them.
Not only did defense counsel fail to adequately cross examine
witnesses as above described, but he failed to put on a defense,
beginning with his waiver of any opening statement. (R. 128-138)
He

then

closed

his

case without

conferring

with Appellant.

Appellant had to ask the Court to reopen the Defendant's case to
let him testify in order to put on any defense whatsoever.
(R. 128-140)
There are several instances in the record that required
defense counsel to take note and investigate.

The first instance

was the mention of an individual present at the storage units when
Le Doux arrived, apparently a lady that rents next to him, was
never located or questioned.

(R. 128-15)
18

Nothing more is

mentioned of this mystery lady and no one knows if she saw anyone
actually breaking into any of the units the day in question.
The second instance was the mention of Lynnette Talbot, the
mystery woman who appeared out of no where to identify a "shell" as
belonging to her that was located in Appellant's storage unit.
(R. 128-82).
testify.

Ms. Talbot was not present at trial, nor did she

However, testimony of her identification and proof of

ownership of alleged stolen property with which Appellant was not
charged, was received into evidence without any objection from
defense counsel.

Officer Hackworth testified that Talbot claimed

ownership of the camper shell.

(R. 128-51)

This was clearly a

verbal statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
was therefore inadmissible hearsay.

Yet, defense counsel made no

attempt to object to or have that testimony stricken.

Hackworth

admitted that this information was not in his police report, and
still defense counsel made no objection and still no Ms. Talbot at
trial.

(R. 128-51)

Further, by the time the police said that

Appellant consented to the opening of his storage unit so that Ms.
Talbot could identify her shell, Appellant was in custody and had
not been advised of his Miranda rights. Still defense counsel did
not object.

It seems clear that the officers and the State were

using hearsay statements and conjecture and presenting them to the
jury to develop their case. The officers had Appellant in custody
and failed to read him his Miranda rights apparently so he would
incriminate himself with information sufficient to convict.
128-34, 35)

(R.

The record is clear that even Detective Bryson had
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arrived at the scene prior to finding the shell.

(R. 128-84)

Appellant was surrounded by uniformed police with no opportunity to
leave the scene or ask for counsel, clearly he was in custody.
The third instance where defense counsel failed to take note
and investigate concerns the photographs that were introduced and
received into evidence. These photographs depict various kinds of
property at various locations.

The State failed to provide any

foundation for the admittance of these pictures and defense failed
to demand one. There is nothing in the record to suggest who took
the pictures, when they were taken and where.

Without a proper

foundation before introduction of the photos, there is no way to
determine if they were true representations of evidence that the
state admitted through testimony of its witnesses. Pursuant to the
very

definition

of

"laying

inadmissible without it.

a

foundation",

the

photos

were

Besides, Defendant was not charged with

the theft of any thing besides the couch and day planner.

The

pictures were prejudicial. The pictures represented a considerable
amount of personal property with which Appellant was not charged.
Again, defense counsel made no objection or even mentioned that a
foundation was needed concerning the photos.
The fourth instance is when defense counsel failed to take
note and investigate concerning the statements that were made by
police officers that they did not see evidence of a break in on the
evening of March 29, 1997.
defense counsel.

(R. 128-89) This was not questioned by

However, it was incumbent on defense counsel to

investigate the reports of the recent burglaries at that location
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by others.

In addition, there were no instruments of burglary

found anywhere near the scene or about person or property of the
Appellant.

(R. 128-98)

There were no cut or broken padlocks on

Appellant in or by his truck or in the area.

In fact, there is no

evidence in the record that Appellant committed burglary at all.
The jury was allowed to assume that because Appellant was in
possession of items that had been in storage units some days prior
to March 29th, he must have committed burglary and theft.

This

allowance was a direct result of defense counsel's failure to put
forth an adequate defense and bring critical information to the
jury concerning the recent burglaries and the fact that Appellant
was charged with theft of only the shell and the couch.
counsel

also

failed

to

investigate

evidence

of

Defense

third party

culpability.
Another example of defense counsel's failure to adequately
represent Appellant is the testimony of Bryson concerning a washing
machine, which was not in evidence and not part of the State's
case.

Admittance of this evidence was prejudicial error.

(R. 128-127 and 129) Although defense counsel argued relevance to
the Court, he should have argued that the prosecutor failed to
support

prejudicial,

inculpatory

inferences

arising

from his

questions with appropriate evidence. Bryson's interview concerning
the washing machine and Appellant's statement to Bryson that "he
knew it was wrong to take it and that he should return it,"
(R. 128-129 and 93), brought improper information to the juror's
attention.

The state did not put on any evidence that the
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Appellant had committed a crime with regards to the washing machine
and piles of other personal property.

The introduction of this

testimony was prejudicial, especially in conjunction with the many
other errors in the case. Again defense counsel failed to provide
an adequate defense when he failed to present Ms. Talbot as a
witness on Appellant's behalf.

Detective Bryson was aware that

Talbot used to go to the same storage units and clean out abandoned
units.

(R. 128-130)

The fifth instance where defense counsel failed to adequately
take note and investigate is when he allowed the police officers to
testify about admissions made by Appellant concerning the drugs in
his pocket and the alleged paraphernalia after Appellant had been
arrested, but before he was instructed as to his rights under
Miranda.

(R. 128-44, 94) This should be a subjective test on the

officer's knowledge.

Where officers knew by that time that they

were holding Appellant for giving false information to a police
officer and still did not advise him of his Miranda rights, it was
error not to object.

By the time Appellant was read his Miranda

rights at the police station, he had totally incriminated himself.
The drug charges were clearly inflammatory to the jury on the theft
and burglary charges.
Finally, the sixth instance that defense counsel failed to
take note and investigate and adequately defend Appellant is when
there was no objection

to the state's

cross

examination of

Appellant concerning paraphernalia and drugs when those subjects
were not mentioned at all during Appellant's direct testimony.
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(R.

128-152)

Defense counsel

failed to object

to the questions

as

beyond the scope of direct and a violation of not only Appellant's
Fifth Amendment rights, but due process as well.

It even appears

from the transcript that defense counsel may have stipulated to the
fact that his client was. guilty of possession and paraphernalia,
even though the "hype kit" contained no syringe, needles or illegal
substance

(R. 128-152 and 154)
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution
guarantee all persons charged with a criminal offense the right to
effective assistance of counsel.

Despite this

constitutionally

mandated right, the Appellant was denied effective assistance of
counsel, wherein his attorney:
(a)

Defendant's attorney failed to investigate the police's

knowledge of recent burglaries of Mollerup's Storage and evidence
of third party culpability.
(b)

Failed

to

file

and/or

argue

suppression

motions

concerning "in custody" statements made by Defendant and repeated
to the jury in reference to the shell, couch and property

with

which Appellant was not charged, and drugs and paraphernalia.
(c)

Failed

to

object

to

Le

Doux's

competence

to

testify

concerning practices and procedures with regards to storage company
activities and with regards to witnesses' inconsistent statements.
(d)

Defendant's attorney closed Appellant's defense without

any witnesses

and

Defendant

had

to

ask

the

Court

if

he

could

testify as he was the only one present which violate^ his Fifth
23

Amendment right to remain silence.
(e)

Failed to demand a foundation before photos were entered

as evidence; they contained

items with which Defendant

was

not

charged and were prejudicial.
(f)

Failed to produce witnesses such as Talbot.

Police said

they knew she would, from time to time, go through open units and
collect property.
(g)

Failed

to

object

to

State's

cross-examination

of

Appellant as beyond scope of direct examine.
(h)

Failed to object to the State's presentation of innuendo

which statements were never supported by any evidence.
The State committed prosecutorial misconduct:
(a)

By putting Appellant's pre-Miranda statements and silence

before the jury.
(b)

Establishing evidence of theft of camper shell by hearsay

even though Appellant was never charged with this theft.
(c)

Presenting unsupported innuendo in opening and through

witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to impute intent and
actions to Defendant that were not supported by any testimony or
evidence

with

regards

to property

with

which

Defendant

is

not

charged, i.e. improper statements by the state concerning property
in Defendant's possession with which he was not charged with theft
or

any

other

crime.

The

State

failed

to

support

prejudicial,

inculpatory inferences arising from his questions with appropriate
evidence.
The trial counsel's omissions were prejudicial by his failure
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to

present

a

defense

and

failure

to

object

to

prejudicial

information that was admitted into evidence by the State.

These,

by themselves, were prejudicial and but for the defense counsel's
ineffective assistance, the outcome of the Appellant's trial would
have been different.

In addition, if the prosecutor had not

committed prosecutorial misconduct, the jury's attention would not
have

been

considered

called
in

to

matters

reaching

which

a verdict.

would

not

be

These

improper

justifiably
statements

require reversal because they should be determined as harmful.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
To demonstrate ineffective representation, a
Defendant must establish (1) his counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2)
but
for
his
counsel's
deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would be
different.
State v. Hovator, 914 P.2d 37
(Utah 1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,
"186-87 (Utah 1990). "A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Tempiin 805 P.2d
at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 US AT 694) .
"The
determination
of
whether
difficult
performance affected the outcome of the trial
must be made by considering the totality of
the evidence [and] taking into account the
entire evidentiary pictures
or have an
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict
is supported by the record." Id; Hovator, 914
P.2d at 38.
A.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INVESTIGATE RECENT BURGLARIES

AT MOLLERUP#S STORAGE.
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The State, through testimony of Mr. Le Doux (R. 128-6) and
Detective

Bryson

(R. 128-131)

brought

forward

evidence

Mollerup's Storage facility had been recently burglarized.

that
In

fact, Le Doux stated that his units had been burglarized as
recently as a week or so prior to Appellant's arrest.

In light of

the fact the Le Doux, the individual who called the police and
observed Appellant's behavior for at least fifteen minutes, did not
see Appellant or his friend break into any unit (R. 128-6) and in
fact, Le Doux testified that the units were not even locked,
(R. 128-9) and in light of the fact that police officers testified
that they did not see any evidence of a break in on the evening of
March 29, 1997 (R. 128-89) and found no evidence of instruments
used for burglary nor cut or broken padlocks on or about the
Appellant or his truck, it was incumbent upon defense counsel to
investigate the recent burglaries to determine any modes operandi,
fingerprints or other evidence which may have existed that would
co-oberate his client's story and develop some theory of the case.
Mr. Gravis did nothing.

This failure to investigate demonstrates

that Appellant's attorney's failure to investigate and see if
others were being charged with prior recent burglaries had a
detrimental impact on the presentation of Appellant's primary
defense - that he was gathering what he thought was abandoned
property from already opened storage units.

Defense counsel

completely failed to investigate or present evidence during his
case in chief of third party culpability.

Clearly, the existence

of the mystery woman, Talbot's hearsay remarks that she filtered
26

through abandoned storage sheds from time to time, the total
failure of the officers to locate any burglary tools on or around
Appellant and the witnesses' statements that they saw no evidence
of burglary or a break in put defense counsel on notice that he was
required

to put

culpability.

on

at

least

some

evidence

of

third

party

This evidence would certainly raise a reasonable

doubt as to the Appellant's guilt.

Third party culpability

evidence is like any other evidence:

If it is relevant, it is

admissible pursuant to Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, unless is
probabitive value is substantially out weighed by the risk of undue
delay, prejudice or confusion.
As

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403.

Wigmore states "if the evidence is really of no appreciable

value, no harm is done in admitting it; but if the evidence is in
truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the Court should not
attempt

to

decide

for

the

jury

that

this

doubt

is purely

speculative and fantastic, but should afford the accused every
opportunity to create that doubt."

(1A wigmore, Evidence (Sellers

Rev. Ed. 1980) Section 139, P. 1724) cited in People v. Hall, 718
P. 2d 99 (Cal. 1986)

When the proper inquiry is to determine

whether evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's
guilt, it was incumbent upon defense counsel to investigate and to
bring that evidence before the Court.

Here, counsel's failure

constitute ineffective assistance for Appellant.
B.

FAILURE

TO

PILE

AND/OR

ARGUE

SUPPRESSION

MOTION

CONCERNING IN CUSTODY STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AND REPEATED TO
THE JURY IN REFERENCE TO THE CAMPER SHELL, COUCH AND MISCELLANEOUS
27

PROPERTY WITH WHICH APPELLANT WAS NOT CHARGED, INCLUDING WASHING
MACHINE, DRUGS AND PARAPHERNALIA.
Defense counsel failed to file and/or argue that Appellant's
in

custody

statements,

as

well

as

pre-Miranda

silence,

was

inadmissible and allowed the State to produce said silence and
statements against interest to the jury during the prosecutor's
opening statements, and examination of witnesses.
"The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or

inculpatory,

stemming

from

custodial

interrogation

of

a

Defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against

self-incrimination".

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 Sup. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2nd
694 (1966).

The Fifth Amendment provides:

"no person shall... be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself".
U.S. Const. Amend. V.

The Court has ruled a Defendant's silence

cannot be used to impeach his testimony at trial if his silence
follows the delivery of Miranda warnings.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.

610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976).
silence

is

insolubly

ambiguous

because

required to advise the person arrested."

of

"Every post arrest
what

the

State

is

Id. 426 U.S. at 617, 96

S. Ct. at 2244.
In

addition,

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

extended

a

Defendant's right to remain silent before he is taken into custody.
In State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349 (Utah App. 1993), the Court
stated:
Merely because an individual does
not need to be advised of his right
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to remain silence until he is
subject to a custodial interrogation
does not mean he should be penalized
for invoking that right earlier. To
hold differently would impermissible
burden Fifth Amendment protections
for any individual who attempts to
exercise them prior to a custodial
interrogation.
Such a rule would
also encourage the authorities to
refrain
from
issuing
Miranda
warnings as long as possible in an
attempt to generate inferential
evidence of guilt from silence or an
admission
prior
to
custodial
interrogation.
Providing
law
enforcement an incentive to withhold
Miranda warnings would be poor
public policy and contrary to the
spirit
of
Fifth
Amendment
jurisprudence."
The statements used concerning Appellant's pre-arrest and incustody silence and statements not only reflect his counsel's
inadequacy, but should be classified as harmful as it undermines
confidence in the verdict, especially in light of the other errors
which occurred in this case. The prosecutor mentioned to the jury,
during his opening statement, that Appellant "volunteers no other
information to the officer."

(R. 129-7) This statement serves no

other purpose that to provide inferential evidence of guilt from
Appellant's silence.
After a formal arrest was made, Appellant was not advised of
his Miranda rights for at least an hour and after he had been
transported to the Roy Police Station. While he was handcuffed and
sitting in one of the patrol cars at Mollerup's Storage, Appellant
is said to have made extremely prejudicial statements to the police
concerning the ownership of a "hype-kit" that was found in the
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truck and marijuana found in his shirt pocket.

Clearly, this is

the type of police behavior anticipated by the Courts in Miranda
and Palmer and their progeny.

Defense counsel made no attempt to

even limit these statements as they were heard by the jury. There
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
It is clear from the record that Appellant was in custody when
Officer Hackworth learned that the Appellant had given false
information to a police officer and the police officer verified
that, in fact, Appellant had given the wrong name and date of
birth. At that time, there were two (2) uniformed police officers
at the scene and Detective Bryson soon arrived. During Appellant's
pre-Miranda encounter with the police officers (R. 128-26, 31, 32
and 33) , the Appellant chose to remain silent during much of the
interview. After Detective Bryson arrived, the Appellant then did
make statements to the police authorizing entry into his truck to
his storage unit and statements made concerning ownership of
property.

At that time, the Appellant was in custody and clearly

cannot be said to have been free to leave the scene.
After police contacted a witness, to-wit:

Nicole Ayers, and

after she identified some articles in and on Appellant's truck to
have been her property located in her storage unit, Appellant was
formerly arrested.

In fact, evidence and id. of this witness came

solely from an illegal search of the truck.

He was not, however,

given his Miranda warnings until approximately an hour later after
having been transported to the Office of Detective Bryson at the
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police station for a personal interview. After his formal arrest,
but prior to Miranda being given to the Appellant, the officer
stated that they found a hype kit in his truck and the Appellant
told the officers that it was his and that he had a drug problem.
Further, they discovered marijuana in his pocket to which he
admitted owning.

(R. 128-123)

In addition, the officers conducted what they classified as a
"inventory search" of the Appellant's truck and storage unit.
(R. 128-95)

This "inventory search" of the truck and the storage

unit were both performed prior to Mirandizing the Appellant.

In

fact, the officers had opened Appellant's truck and taken articles
out of the truck prior to Appellant's formal arrest so the search
cannot be classified as a search incident to an arrest.

This

behavior on the part of the police officers at this point in time
can clearly not be identified as performing an "inventory search".
There is absolutely no reason why the officers could have not
secured a search warrant for the storage shed and the Appellant's
truck.

There were no extenuating circumstances, as the Appellant

was clearly restrained by police and not free to leave after the
officer had discovered that the Appellant had given him a false
name and date of birth.

Appellant's statements while made in

custody were clearly prejudicial and should have been suppressed.
There was no possible benefit to Appellant for not filing a
suppression motion.
The State relied heavily upon the Appellant's statement that
everything in the truck belonged to him.
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During the prosecutor's

opening arguments as well as during the trial on the matter the
State dealt heavily on this.

In addition, it is admitted by the

State that the Appellant was under arrest when he admitted to
owning the drug paraphernalia and the marijuana found after the
arrest, but before the State decided to provide the Appellant with
his Miranda rights.
C.

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO LE DOUX'S COMPETENCE TO TESTIFY

CONCERNING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES WITH REGARDS TO STORAGE COMPANY
ACTIVITIES AND WITH REGARDS TO WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.
The State called Mr. Le Doux for two reasons:

First, to

establish who called the police to Mollerup's Storage and second,
to

testify

concerning

Mollerup's

practices

and

procedures

concerning the safe keeping of property in individual units.

Its

the second purpose of Le Doux's testimony that was improper and
highly prejudicial.

Defense counsel not only failed to object to

the lack of foundation to this testimony, but also failed to call
into question Le Doux's inconsistent statements.
Mr. Le Doux had nothing to do with the management or rental of
the units at Mollerup's, but only maintained two rental units at
the facility.

He testified that he was aware of the management

policy and procedures used when tenants failed to pay their rent in
a timely manner (R. 128-8) , but went on to admit that his knowledge
came from the fact that his storage units were sealed by Mollerup
because he was delinquent in his rental payments and that he could
not gain access to those units as a result thereof.

(R. 128-9)

He

had no idea of Mollerup's policies when property was abandoned when
32

renters failed to pay rent for long periods of time.
Rule 4 01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "relevant
evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

The only value of Le Doux's testimony concerning

Mollerup's procedures is to create an assumption that property is
never

abandoned

and

therefore,

all

property

in

Appellant's

possession came from Appellant burglarizing storage units.

This

testimony was extremely prejudicial, even in the event the Court
finds the testimony relevant.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides that even if
evidence is relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probation
value

is substantially

out weighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...

By

allowing the assumption that Mollerup's Storage never abandoned
property or left unit doors open when property had been abandoned,
an assumption

created by Le Doux's testimony, Appellant was

extremely prejudiced, especially in light of the fact that the
State knew the manager of the storage units and, in fact, knew he
had been present during the search on March 2 9th. Detective Bryson
testified that she knew who he was.

Defense counsel failed to

object and failed to make any inquiries concerning management
practices and/or policies from management personnel.
In addition, while Mr. Le Doux observed Appellant for about 15
minutes prior to the arrival of the police, during which time
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Appellant went on with his business, defense counsel failed to
object to Le Doux's speculation that Appellant had no reason to pay
attention to him.

(R. 128-13)

Defense counsel failed to inquire

as to the location of the witness and whether Appellant appeared to
know he was there and watching. The argument should have been made
that if Appellant was aware of the witness' observations, and
continued his activity, it is reasonable that Appellant felt his
activities innocent and made no effort to hide them.
D.

DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY CLOSED DEFENSE WITHOUT ANY WITNESSES

AND DEFENDANT HAD TO ASK THE COURT IF HE COULD TESTIFY AS HE WAS
THE ONLY POSSIBLE WITNESS PRESENT IN HIS BEHALF.
Not only did defense counsel fail to adequately cross examine
witnesses as above described, but he failed to put on a defense,
beginning with his waiver of any opening statement.
He

then

closed

his

case without

conferring

(R. 128-138)

with Appellant.

Appellant had to ask the Court to reopen to let him testify in
order to put on any defense whatsoever.

(R. 128-140)

There are several other instances in the record that required
defense counsel to take note and investigate.
1.

The first instance was the mention of an individual

present at the storage units when Le Doux arrived, apparently a
lady who rents next to him, who was never located or questioned.
(R. 128-15) Nothing more is mentioned of this mystery lady and no
one knows if she saw anyone actually breaking into any of the units
the day in question.
2.

The second instance was the mention of Lynnette Talbot,
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the mystery woman who appeared out of nowhere to identify a "shell"
as belonging to her that was located in Appellant's storage unit,
(R. 128-82) and Appellant was never charged with theft of this
item. Ms. Talbot was not present at trial nor did she testify.
However, her identification and proof of ownership of alleged
stolen property was received into evidence without any objection
from defense counsel.

Hackworth testified that Talbot claimed

ownership of the camper shell.

(R. 128-51)

This was clearly a

non-verbal statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted
and was therefore inadmissible hearsay and yet, defense counsel
made no attempt to object to or have that testimony stricken.
Hackworth admitted that this information was not in his police
report, and still defense counsel made no objection and still there
was no Ms. Talbot at trial.

(R. 128-51) Further, by the time that

Appellant consented to the opening of his storage unit so that Ms.
Talbot could identify her shell, Appellant was in custody and had
not been advised of his Miranda rights. Still defense counsel did
not object.

It seems clear that the officers and the State were

using hearsay statements and conjecture and presenting them to the
jury to develop their case. The officers had Appellant in custody
and failed to read him his Miranda rights so he would incriminate
himself with information sufficient to convict.

(R. 128-34) Even

Detective Bryson had arrived at the scene prior to finding the
shell.

(R. 128-84)

Appellant was surrounded by uniformed police

with no opportunity to leave the scene or ask for counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article
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7 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

Also Bryson testified that

Talbot used to go to the storage units and clean out abandoned
units.
E.

Defense counsel did not talk to nor did he subpoena Talbot.
FAILURE TO DEMAND A FOUNDATION BEFORE PHOTOS WERE ENTERED

AS EVIDENCE; THEY CONTAINED ITEMS WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT
CHARGED AND WERE PREJUDICIAL.
There were many photographs that were introduced and received
into

evidence

without

objection

of

defense

counsel.

These

photographs depict various kinds of property at various locations.
The State failed to provide any foundation for the admittance of
these pictures and defense failed to demand one.

There is nothing

in the record to suggest who took the pictures, when they were
taken and where.

Without a proper foundation before introduction

of the photos, there is no way to determine if they were true
representations of evidence that the State had admitted through
testimony of its witnesses.

Pursuant to the very definition of

"laying a foundation", the photos were inadmissible without it.
Besides, Defendant was not charged with the theft of anything
besides the couch and camper shell. The pictures were prejudicial.
The pictures represented a considerable amount of personal property
with which Appellant was not charged and may very well have owned.
Again, defense counsel made no objection or even mentioned that a
foundation was needed concerning the photos.

State's exhibit P-l

was a photo of Ayers' couch identified by Hackworth at (R. 128-20),
identified by Ayers at (R. 128-61) and received into evidence at
(R. 128-62).

State's exhibit P-2 was a photo of property contained
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in the truck, identified by Hackworth at (R. 128-22), identified by
Ayers at (R. 128-64) and received by the Court at (R. 128-64) .
State's exhibit P-6 was a photo of Appellant's truck and was
identified by Stevens at (R. 128-79), by Hackworth at (R. 128-20)
and received into evidence at (R. 128-134) . Apparently there were
other photos offered but not received.

(R. 128-134)

State's

exhibit 15 was admitted into evidence over defense objection, but
there had been no identification of this exhibit during the trial.
(R. 128-134)

State's exhibit 10 was identified by Stevens and

received into evidence by the Court.

(R. 128-92, 93, 134)

It is

unclear from the transcript whether State's exhibit 7 was received,
there had been no identification of this exhibit during the trial
on the matter.

All items that were photographed, but with which

Appellant was not charged, including the camper shell and washing
machine,

were

not

relevant

and

should

"Determining whether evidence is relevant

have

been

excluded.

requires a balancing of

factors and [the Court] will reverse a determination of relevancy
only if the trial Court abused its discretion."

Olympus Hills v.

Smiths Food King, 889 P.2d 445, 454 (Utah App. 1994) citing State
v. Wetzel, 868 P. 2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) . Not only were the mention
and photographs of the camper shell, washing machine and boxes of
other items improper for the purpose of proving Appellant stole
them, but they were improperly put to the jury for no other
reasons.

Surely, these items cannot be used to prove burglary,

although it appears that they were put before the jury for that
purpose.

The State created improper and prejudicial innuendo and
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defense

counsel

failed

to

object

and

the

Court

abused

its

discretion by allowing the photos to go to the jury.
Detective Bryson's testimony concerning the washing machine
and Appellant's alleged confession with regards thereto had no
purpose but to inflame the jury.

(R. 128-127-129)

Defense counsel

failed to object that the prosecutor failed to support prejudicial,
inculpatory inferences arising from his questions and statements
with appropriate evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, may nevertheless
be excluded by reason of the general principle that usefulness of
evidence is more than counterbalanced by disadvanteous effects in
confusing issues before the jury, or in creating undue prejudice in
excess of its legitimate probative weight.
605 P.2d, 314, 322 (Utah 1979).

Terry v. Zions Co-op,

This evidence had no conceivable

beneficial value to Appellant and the failure to object to it
cannot be excused as trial strategy.

Appellant's counsel was

deficient in failing to object to evidence so clearly in violation
of Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
P.

DEFENSE FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE CROSS EXAMINATION

OF

APPELLANT AS BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF DIRECT AND THE COURT SHOULD
HAVE RECOGNIZED THE ERROR.
Rule 104(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "the
accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become
subject to cross examination as to other issues in the case."
During

Appellant's

trial, defense

counsel

rested

without

consulting Appellant or calling any witnesses. Appellant presented
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his theory of the case in reference to theft and burglary to the
jury during his direct examination.

During the prosecutor's cross

examination, the State began questioning Appellant concerning the
"hype kit" and marijuana.

Defense counsel objected on the grounds

of relevancy, but failed to bring the question of "beyond the scope
of direct and Rule 104(d) Utah Rules of Evidence to the Court's
attention.

(R. 128-152)

It also appears from the transcript that

defense counsel may have stipulated that his client was guilty of
the two drug charges.

(R. 128-152 and 154)

Defense counsel's

conduct was extremely prejudicial to Appellant.
0,

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ARGUE THAT THE OFFICES AT THE

SCENE HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIS ACTIVITIES AND SEARCH
HIS TRUCK AND THAT THE DETENTION WAS NOT REASONABLE IN SCOPE AS IT
RELATED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
The Court must make a duel inquiry to determine whether a
search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable:

" (l) Was the

police officer's action justified at its inception and (2) was the
resulting

detention

reasonably

related

in

scope

to

the

circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?"
Rodriguez-Lopez, supra at 20, citing State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 1127,
1131-32.
Section 77-7-15 (1995), Utah Code Annotated provides when "a
peace officer may stop a person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions."
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This section mandates a reasonable suspicion in a public place
that an officer observes.
Here, the police were informed of suspicious activity on
private property.

The officers obtained

a false name from

Appellant, but had no evidence at that time that he was committing
or about to commit a public offense.

Certainly, the giving of a

false name does not permit the officer, nor provide the authority
to the officer of entering Appellant's vehicle without an arrest or
inventory search.

There was nothing illegal and in plain sight

that would lead the officer to believe he needed to search the
truck for weapons, especially in light of the fact that Appellant
was not near the truck anyway.
The Court requires that the resulting detention is reasonably
related

in

scope

to

the

circumstances

which

justified

the

interference in the first place.
There was no one at the scene that observed Appellant breaking
into any storage unit or stealing any property.

Further, the

Appellant had every right to be on the property because he also
rented a unit. The police found no witness to identify property in
Appellant's possession that was not his until after they improperly
entered the back of the tuck.

"A warrantless search of an

automobile is not justified by probable cause alone, but must also
be premised upon exigent circumstances.11

State v. Maycock, 329

Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (10/30/97) Long before the officers entered the
truck, they knew that Appellant had given a false name and that
they would be taking him to jail.
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It would have been appropriate

to impound the truck and make a proper inventory.

Had they done

what they should have done, many of the items shown to the jury
could well have belonged to the Appellant, substantiating his
defense.

Still, defense counsel did not object.
ISSUE 2
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A.

PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS AND SILENCE.

Appellant incorporates his arguments contained in Section IB
above and incorporates that argument herein as through specifically
stated herein.
As stated in State v. Fence, 109 Wis. 2.d 224, 325 N.W. 2d 703
(1982), cited in Palmer, supra at 860 P.2d 339, 349:
The Fifth Amendment protects a
person
from
compelled
selfincrimination at all times, not just
upon arrest or during custodial
interrogation.
Any
time
an
individual is questioned by the
police, that individual is compelled
to do one of two things - either
speak or remain silent. If both a
person's pre-arrest
speech and
silence may be used against that
person, as the State suggests, that
person has no choice that will
present self-incrimination. This is
a verifiable "catch 22". Thus the
State's
theory
places
an
impermissible burden on the exercise
of Fifth Amendment rights.
In the case before the bar, Hackworth began questioning
Appellant and Amador immediately upon his arrival.
remained silent during most of this questioning.

Appellant
Appellant's

silence during this questioning was made clear to the jury by the
State during the trial (R. 128-26, 31, 32 and 33) and during the
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State's opening statement.

(R. 129-7)

Further, after the arrival

of Stevens and Bryson, the officers had knowledge that Appellant
had given false information to a police officer and Appellant was
clearly not free to leave and was in custody.

Appellant's

statements concerning ownership of property, as well as his consent
to search the storage shed and the officer's search of the truck
prior to the "inventory search" should have been suppressed.
The prosecutor was well aware of the fact that after an
arrest, the State is required to give an individual his Miranda
rights prior to interrogating

him concerning anything.

The

Appellant had not waived any rights whatsoever when the police
began interrogating him when he was first taken into custody after
Hackworth found out that he had given him a false name and date of
birth. Appellant was never advised that he did not have to discuss
anything concerning this matter without the assistance of counsel
or that any statements he made could and would be used against him
in a Court of law.

The prosecutor also committed misconduct when

he established that the Appellant committed theft of the shell by
hearsay, especially since Appellant was never charged with that
theft. The State knew or should have know that the identification
of the stolen shell could only be made by the individual owning the
shell. Anything else was hearsay. The officer testifying that Ms.
Talbot owned the shell was, at the very least, a non verbal
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and was
inadmissible.

Further, by the time Appellant consented to the

opening of the storage unit so that Mrs. Talbot could identify her
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shell, Appellant was in custody and had not been advised of his
Miranda rights.
As noted in State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992),
generally the test used for determining whether a prosecutor's
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks
called

to

the

juror's

attention

matters

which

would

justified in considering and in reaching a verdict.

not

be

Improper

statements will require reversal if they are determined to be
harmful.

Because the prosecutor's misconduct during his cross

examination of Appellant should have been obvious to the trial
Court, it should be considered to be harmful.

State v. Palmer, 860

P.2d 342 (Utah Ct. App., 1993); quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d
48, 51 (Utah, 1983) .
B.

THE

PRESENTING
THROUGH

STATE

UNSUPPORTED

THE WITNESSES

COMMITTED
INNUENDOS
DURING

THE

PROSECUTORIAL
IN HIS OPENING
TRIAL

ON

MISCONDUCT

BY

STATEMENT

AND

THE MATTER,

WHICH

PROVIDED THE JURY A BASIS TO IMPUTE MOTIVES AND ACTIONS ON THE PART
OF T HE APPELLANT THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY TESTIMONY WITH
REGARDS TO PROPERTY WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT CHARGED, I.E.
IMPROPER STATEMENTS BY THE STATE CONCERNING PROPERTY IN DEFENDANTS
POSSESSION FOR WHICH HE WAS NOT CHARGED WITH THEFT OR ANY OTHER
CRIME, SUCH AS BOXES AS PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE WASHING MACHINE
THAT WAS IN HIS STORAGE SHED.
The

State

failed

to

support

prosecutory

and

inculpatory

inferences arising from his opening statement and questions with
appropriate evidence.

There was never any evidence produced that
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articles other than Talbots and Nicole Ayers' property belonged to
anybody else but Appellant.

The innuendo throughout the trial,

however, was that there was a truck full of items that did not
belong to the Appellant. The State put on absolutely

no evidence

that this property did not belong to the Appellant. The inference
was there that the Appellant had gone through many storage units
and had stolen all of that property, even though the State produced
no victim and no identification of the property, and that the
Appellant was never charged with theft of that property.

Even if

Appellant was charged with other thefts, the trials would have been
served and each act restricted to each separate trial.
Tarafa, 720 P.2d

1368

(Utah 198)

State v.

The theft with which the

Appellant was charged was identified to be property of Nicole
Ayers, to-wit:

A couch and a day planner of a value less than

$300.00. The use of boxes of items, photographs of boxes of items
and Bryson's interview with the Appellant concerning the washing
machine was inadmissible and clearly prejudicial.

Other than

Nicole Ayers7 testimony, there is no evidence in the record that
the Appellant committed burglary other than by inference.

There

were no burglary tools in the area, no witnesses observed the
Appellant breaking into any of the storage units, there were no
broken locks found on or about the Appellant's property.

The

inference surely was drawn by the jury that because he had all of
these items in his truck that apparently did not belong to him,
that he must have broken in and burglarized the other storage
units. Without the photographs and the testimony concerning other
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property, clearly there is a question as to what the outcome would
have been.

If the State had been limited to discussing only those

items with which the Appellant was charged, to-wit: the couch and
the day planner, and if the photographs of all the boxes of
property and the piles of property had been excluded and if the
inadmissible statements made by Appellant had been excluded, it
would have been very difficult for the jury to reach a verdict of
guilty of burglary or the Misdemeanor counts. As the Court found
in State v. Emmett, supra at 786 - 787, (generally it is error to
ask an accused

a question

that

implies

the existence of a

prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can prove the existence of
that fact.

The introduction of the testimony concerning the

washing machine and piles and piles of property belonging to
apparently

no

one

was

clearly

a prejudicial

prosecutor did not prove the existence of.

fact

that

the

In this case, the

nature of the prosecutor's statements during opening argument and
questions

during

examination

of

witnesses

and

the

strong

inculpatory inference contained therein, must lead the Court to
dispense with the requirement of obviousness with regards to the
plain error test so that justice can be done.

An analysis of the

harmfulness of this error should be considered in conjunction with
all other errors of the case.
A comment by a prosecutor during opening arguments that the
jury consider matters that are not proved as evidence during the
trial is prosecutorial misconduct.
Because the Defendant's counsel failed to object to the comments,
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the Court can reach them under the plan error analysis and/or
evaluate defenses' failure to object under the Strickland test as
to ineffective assistance of counsel.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's attorney failed to investigate recent burglaries
of Mollerup's Storage Facility and failed to investigate evidence
of third party culpability.
Defendant's attorney failed to file and/or argue suppression
motions concerning pre-miranda silence and in custody statements
made by

Defendant and repeated to the jury in reference to the

camper shell, various personal property, drug paraphernalia and
ownership of property with which Appellant was not charged.
Defense counsel failed to object to Le Doux's competency to
testify concerning practices and procedure with regards to the
storage company activities and with regards to the witnesses'
inconsistent statements.
Defense counsel failed to adequately defend and closed his
case without calling witnesses or consultation with his client,
which forced Appellant to ask the Court directly if he could
testify to at least put on some theory of the defense and some
defense at all.

Defendant was effectively forced to testify

against himself in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah
State Constitution.
Defense counsel failed to object to State's photo exhibits
which were admitted into evidence without objection from defense
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counsel and which were prohibited by Rules 401 and 403, Utah Rules
of Evidence, and which were highly prejudicial and contained
articles with which Defendant was not charged, which allowed the
jury to speculate that Appellant had stolen or retrieved these
items from burglarized storage units.
Defense counsel failed to object to the State's improperly
presented unsupported innuendo in his opening statement and through
witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to impute motives and
actions to Defendant that were not supported by any testimony with
regards to property with which Defendant was not charged, i.e.
improper statements by the State concerning property in Defendant's
possession with which he was not charged with theft or any other
crime.

The State failed

to support prejudicial

inculpatory

inferences arising from his opening statement and examination of
witnesses with appropriate evidence.
The

State

inadmissible

offered

pre-miranda

and

the

silence

Court
and

in

received

Appellant's

custody

statements.

The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting
unsupported innuendo in opening statements, and through witness
testimony which provided the jury a basis to impute motives and
actions of Appellant that were not supported by any testimony with
regards to property with which Appellant was not charged, i.e. in
proper statements by the State concerning property in Appellant's
possession even though he was never charged with the theft of those
items.

The State failed to support prejudicial inculpatory
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inferences arising from the State's questions with appropriate
evidence.
DATED this

day of May, 1998.

RANDINE SALERNO,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted in the United States mail,
postage prepaid on this ^

day of May, 1998 and addressed to:

Jan Graham
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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48

76-6-105

CRIMINAL CODE

(b) a class B misdemeanor if the damage to property is
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000 in value; and
(c) a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property is
or exceeds $150 but is less than $300 in value.
(4) Any other violation under Subsection (c) shall constitute
an infraction.
1995
76-6-105. C a u s i n g a c a t a s t r o p h e .
(1) Any person who by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche,
collapse of a building, release of poison gas, radioactive
material, or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or
by any other means, causes a widespread injury or damage to
persons or property is guilty of causing a catastrophe.
(2) Causing a catastrophe is a felony of the second degree if
the person causes it knowingly and a class A misdemeanor if
caused recklessly.
1973
76-6-106. Criminal mischief.
( 1 ) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding
an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the
property of another and thereby:
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
interruption or impairment of any public utility service;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the
property of another; or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or
other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane,
boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether
moving or standing.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the
third degree.
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any other violation of this section is a:
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to
or in excess of $5,000 in value;
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to
or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value;
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to
or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in value;
and
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less
than $300 in value.
(3) In determining the value of damages under this section,
or for computer crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of
any computer, computer network, computer property, computer services, software, or data shall include the measurable
value of the loss of use of such items and the measurable cost
to replace or restore such items.
1997
76-6-107.

Graffiti defined — P e n a l t i e s — R e m o v a l c o s t s
— R e i m b u r s e m e n t liability.
(1) "Graffiti" means any form of unauthorized printing,
writing, spraying, scratching, affixing, or inscribing on the
property of another regardless of the content or nature of the
material used in the commission of the act.
(2) "Victim" means the person or entity whose property was
defaced by the graffiti and bears the expense for its removal.
(3) Graffiti is a:
(a) second degree felony if the damage caused is in
excess of $5,000;

(b) third degree felony if the damage caused is *£*
of $1,000;
.3!
(c) class A misdemeanor if the damage caused w
to or in excess of $300; and
.}.S
(d) class B misdemeanor if the damage causell
than $300.
*
(4) Damages under Subsection (3) include reu _
repair costs, or replacement costs, whichever is lesi"
(5) The court, upon conviction or adjudication, u.
restitution to the victim in the amount of removal j
replacement costs.
(6) An additional amount of $1,000 in restitution^,.,
added to removal costs if the graffiti is positioned^
overpass or an underpass, requires that traffic be C "
with in order to remove it, or the entity responsible!
area in which the clean-up is to take place must 1
assistance in order for the removal to take place i _
(7) A person who voluntarily and at his own ex
removes graffiti for which he is responsible may be c
the removal costs against restitution ordered by a cou
PART 2
BURGLARY A N D CRIMINAL TRESPASS!
76-6-201. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
'. *
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping]!!
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight i
modation of persons or for carrying on businessT
and includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied ]
the structure or vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or
with the structure or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usuallyi
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whetherr
a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in I
premises when the premises or any portion ttiererfl
time of the entry or remaining are not open to twfp
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or pnvwj
to enter or remain on the premises or such^
thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or ^J|
(b) intrusion of any physical object undera
the actor.
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or^jj
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a build
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assau
person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a fefea
second degree.
76-6-203. A g g r a v a t e d burglary.
ftl
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if ^.Jj
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the,
another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person w n 0 j | |
participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a c
weapon against any person who is not a partiap
crime; or
M'i
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explo®
gerous weapon.
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(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under such circumstances
that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a
reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means,
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and
embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an
impression of law or fact that is false and that the
actor does not believe to be true and tha£ is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact
that the actor previously created or confirmed by
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment
of another and that the actor does not now believe to
be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is
or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction, which
performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that
failure to perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the
promise would not be performed.
1973
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an
interest in the property or service stolen if another person
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right
to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property
or service honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented.
1974
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees,
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by

evidence that it was committed in any manner siv
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the u
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a contmS
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprj
76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises I
rized control over the property of another with a i
deprive him thereof.
76-6-405. Theft by deception.
( D A person commits theft if he obtains or exen
over property of another by deception and with a i
deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, wh
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary sii
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary?
in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an ex
commendation of wares or worth in communicatj
dressed to the public or to a class or group.
76-6-406. Theft by extortion.
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or'i
control over the property of another by extortion i
purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs whenl
threatens to:
^*
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to i
threatened or to any other person or to prop
time; or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any <
to physical confinement or restraint; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a'<
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
fr|
(e) Reveal any information sought to be con
the person threatened; or
(f) Testify or provide information or wit]
mony or information with respect to another's!
or defense; or
(g) Take action as an official against any
thing, or withhold official action, or cause su
withholding; or
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boyo
similar collective action to obtain property ^
demanded or received for the benefit of the j
the actor purports to represent; or
(i) Do any other act which would not in its
tially benefit him but which would harm i
any other person with respect to that
safety, business, calling, career,financial<
tation, or personal relationships.
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistal
ered property.
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another whicJ
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been de
a mistake as to the identity of the recipien^
nature or amount of the property, without £a
able measures to return it to the owner; f
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the^
property when he obtains the property o&
prior to taking the measures designated^injr
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — 1
brokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives/?*
poses of the property of another knowing
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall
be deposited in the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit
information to the database as required under this section
after the division h a s submitted a specific written request
for the information or when the division determines the
individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit
the information as required is grounds for the division to
take the following actions in accordance with Section
58-1-401:
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more t h a n $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
1996
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d t h a t is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a p a r t of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions t h a t are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the
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person occupies a position of organizer, supervi.
sor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more t h a n 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more t h a n one ounce but less t h a n 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, t h a t person
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty t h a n
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less t h a n one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false n a m e or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, U t a h Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
(viii); or
(x) with a person younger t h a n 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of
not less t h a n five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification t h a t would otherwise have been
established would have been less t h a n a first degree
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for t h a t offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
subsection t h a t the actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
t h a t the actor mistakenly believed t h a t the location where
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a)
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred
was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty
of one degree less t h a n the maximum penalty prescribed for
t h a t offense.
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence t h a t
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
of the substance or substances.
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
for h u m a n s , from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
and supervision.
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under
this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
58-37-8.5.

A p p l i c a b i l i t y of Title 76 p r o s e c u t i o n s u n d e r
t h i s chapter.
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
chapter.
1997
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; a C counting of expenditures and revenues from the
iJder this section.
legislature may annually provide, in the Appro~Act, legislative direction for anticipated expendi^3r£he monies received under this section.
1996
fj* Admissibility of U t a h State Crime Laboras^tory d o c u m e n t s — D r u g a n a l y s i s in criminal
TP pretrial p r o c e e d i n g s .
^ j j u n i s s i o n e r of the Department of Public Safety shall
' i standards for administration and interpretation of
^J^and forensic analysis in accordance with Title 63,
iter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, of:
controlled substances as provided in Title 58, Chap-

J37;
£(2)*'drug paraphernaha as provided in Title 58, Chapter
7a;
1(3) imitation controlled substances as provided in Title
jjyChapter 37b; and
Eft}* controlled substance precursors as provided in Title
^58, Chapter 37d.
1995

CHAPTER 37a
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Short title.
Purpose.
"Drug paraphernalia" denned.
Considerations in determining whether object is
drug paraphernalia.
Unlawful acts.
Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights.
7a-l. Short title.
I^This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Rug Paraphernalia Act."
1981
B£7a-2. Purpose.
¥B;1a*'the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of
narcotics by eliminating paraphernalia designed for processTOringesting, or otherwise using a controlled substance.
HMtfa-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined.
l a p s e d in this chapter:
| ^ | . * D r u g paraphernalia" means any equipment, product,
0$%or material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate,
| j b cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, conpfeS!^* produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package,
g l t e p a c k a g e , store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
&||to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
y^r 1 1 1 " 1 1 1 ^ d y in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, and
includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Kits used, or intended for use, in planting,
propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any
8pecies of plant which is a controlled substance or
from which a controlled substance can be derived;
(2) Kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturi n g , compounding, converting, producing, processing,
°r preparing a controlled substance;
(3) Isomerization devices used, or intended for use,
to increase the potency of any species of plant which
js a controlled substance;
(4) Testing equipment used, or intended for use, to
identify or to analyze the strength, effectiveness, or
Purity of a controlled substance;
m (5) Scales and balances used, or intended for use,
111
Weighing or measuring a controlled substance;
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(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled
substance;
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, or intended
for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other impurities
from marihuana;
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing
devices used, or intended for use to compound a
controlled substance;
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to package small
quantities of a controlled substance;
(10) Containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a controlled substance;
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a
controlled substance into the h u m a n body; and
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to ingest,
inhale, or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine,
hashish, or hashish oil into the h u m a n body, including but not limited to:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens,
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured
metal bowls;
(b) Water pipes;
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold
burning material, such as a m a r i h u a n a cigarette,
t h a t has become too small or too short to be held
in the hand;
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;
(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
(j) Air-driven pipes;
(k) Chillums;
(1) Bongs; and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
1981
58-37a-4.

C o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r obj e c t is d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a .
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the
trier of fact, in addition to all other logically relevant factors,
should consider:
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of
the object concerning its use;
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in
control of the object, under any state or federal law
relating to a controlled substance;
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a
direct violation of this chapter;
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with
the object concerning its use;
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object
which explain or depict its use;
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) the m a n n e r in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the
object is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to
the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of
tobacco products;
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(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of
sales of the object to the total sales of the business
enterprise;
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the
object in the community; and
(13) expert testimony concerning its use.
1981
58-37a-5. U n l a w f u l acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the h u m a n body in violation of this
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any
drug paraphernalia, knowing t h a t the drug paraphernalia will
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three
years or more younger t h a n the person making the delivery is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing t h a t the purpose of the advertisement is
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1981

58-37a-6. S e i z u r e — F o r f e i t u r e — P r o p e r t y rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and
no property right can exist in it.
1981
CHAPTER 37b
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Section
58-37b-l.
58-37b-2.
58-37b-3.
58-37b-4.
58-37b-5.
58-3 7b-6.
58-3 7b-7.
58-37b-8.

Short title.
Definitions.
Considerations in determining whether substance is imitation controlled substance.
Manufacture, distribution or possession of substance unlawful — Penalty.
Repealed.
Use of substance unlawful — Penalty.
Advertisement of substance unlawful — Penalty.
Exemption of persons registered under Controlled Substances Act.

58-37b-l. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Imitation
Controlled Substances Act."
1982
58-37b-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as
provided in Section 58-37-2.
(2) "Distribute" means the actual, constructive, or attempted sale, transfer, delivery, or dispensing to another
of an imitation controlled substance.

(3) "Imitation controlled substance" means a substa£§
that is not a controlled substance or counterfeit controljS
substance, and which by overall dosage unit substantially
resembles a specific controlled substance in appearand
including its color, shape, or size.
4I
(4) "Manufacture" means the production, preparatittf
compounding, processing, encapsulating, tableting, p g S
aging or repackaging, labeling or relabeling, of an imit^
tion controlled substance.
U*
58-37b-3.

C o n s i d e r a t i o n s in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r si^'
s t a n c e is i m i t a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . ,-~;
If the appearance of the dosage unit is not reasonably
sufficient to establish t h a t the substance is an imitati<J
controlled substance, as in liquids or powders, the followii*
factors should be considered:
^
(1) statements made by an owner or by anyone else Q
control of the substance, concerning the nature of tfc
substance, its use or effect, or its similarity to a controlled
substance;
J
(2) statements made to the recipient t h a t the substance
may be resold at a price substantially higher than the
usual and customary price for the ingredients contained
in the substance;
,|
(3) whether the substance is packaged or labeled i n !
manner similar to t h a t generally used for controlled
substances;
>t
(4) evasive tactics or actions utilized by the owner "or
person in control of the substance to avoid detection "bjr
law enforcement authorities;
^1
(5) prior convictions of an owner or anyone in control of
the object, under state or federal law related to controlled
substances or fraud; and
*3
(6) the proximity of the substances to controlled sul*
stances.
.ltt
58-37b-4.

Manufacture, d i s t r i b u t i o n or p o s s e s s i o n ol
s u b s t a n c e unlawful — Penalty.
It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or
possess with intent to distribute, an imitation controlled
substance. Any person who violates this section is guilty oft
class A misdemeanor.
19W
58-37b-5.

Repealed.

1987

58-37b-6. U s e of s u b s t a n c e u n l a w f u l — Penalty.
4
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent
to use, an imitation controlled substance. Any person who
violates this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
i#l
58-37b-7.

A d v e r t i s e m e n t of s u b s t a n c e u n l a w f u l — Pert
alty.
^
It is unlawful for any person to place any newspaper
magazine, handbill, or other publication, or to post or distr%
ute in any public place, any advertisement or solicitation wiw'
reasonable knowledge that the purpose of the advertisemenj
or solicitation is to promote the distribution of imitatic*
controlled substances. Any person who violates this section tf
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
*#|
4*:
58-37b-8. E x e m p t i o n of p e r s o n s r e g i s t e r e d u n d e r Col*
:
trolled S u b s t a n c e s Act.
'~k
No civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue ».
this act on any person registered under the Controlled Sub*
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses a£
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investr
gational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinal
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its execution. A copy of the warrant or notice of its
J0**\^ and terms may be sent to one or more peace officers.
^j0*"^ o r notice communicated authorizes the officer to
lH&* ?in the same manner under it as if he had an original
1980

s - -, Possession of w a r r a n t by a r r e s t i n g officer n o t
?T"
required.
^ V peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding
nt of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably believes
Zte the person described in the warrant, withe
jfcer having physical possession of the warrant.
1980
%T-12« Detaining p e r s o n s s u s p e c t e d of shoplifting or
&&£
library theft — P e r s o n s a u t h o r i z e d .
Wn\ A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, serfr^ o r agent who has reasonable grounds to believe that
mods held or displayed for sale by the merchant have been
'Ken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose of
ki«*tigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a
^Wcovgjy of the goods, detain the person in a reasonable
•tnner for a reasonable length of time.
t (2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a
'person for the purposes and under the limits of Subsection (1)
f there are reasonable grounds to believe the person violated
JHle 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft.
1987
7£7-lS. Arrest w i t h o u t w a r r a n t b y p e a c e officer —
)/;
Reasonable g r o u n d s , w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s — Exftfo
emption from civil or c r i m i n a l liability.
tvT(D A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, any person
l l has reasonable ground to believe has committed a theft
index Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, or of goods
kid or displayed for sale.
f: (2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under Part 8,
library Theft, by an employee of a library, or by a merchant,
•erchant's employee, servant, or agent constitutes a reason(lfcle ground for arrest, and the police officer is relieved from
tBqr civil or criminal liability.
1987

SrST£7-14.

Person c a u s i n g d e t e n t i o n or arrest of p e r s o n
^
suspected of s h o p l i f t i n g or library theft —
jji5.
Civil and c r i m i n a l immunity.
Ml) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, ser?J*nt» or agent who causes the detention of a person as
Jwrided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a
Jjwon for theft of goods held or displayed for sale, is not
;£™aally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and
t |wable cause to believe the person detained or arrested
S o t t e d a theft of goods held or displayed for sale.
Wp A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a
fiction or arrest of a person under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part
Pjlgfrary Theft, is not criminally or civilly liable where he has
gffcjable and probable cause to believe that the person
X^k^ a ^ n : of library materials.
1987
J*5» Authority of p e a c e officer t o s t o p a n d q u e s t i o n
p ^ f suspect — G r o u n d s .
|*5*ce officer may stop any person in a public place when
H* a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
*r** act of committing or is attempting to commit a public
and may demand his name, address and an explana* his actions.
1980
Authority of p e a c e officer t o frisk s u s p e c t for
dangerous w e a p o n — G r o u n d s .
officer who has stopped a person temporarily for
-y£ m a y frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he
% believes he or any other person is in danger. 1980

77-7-20

77-7-17.

A u t h o r i t y of p e a c e officer to t a k e p o s s e s s i o n
of w e a p o n s .
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a
frisk may take and keep it until the completion of the
questioning, at which time he shall either return it if lawfully
possessed, or arrest such person.
1980
77-7-18.

Citation o n m i s d e m e a n o r or
infraction
charge.
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any
public official of any county or municipality charged with the
enforcement of the law, a port-of-entry agent as defined in
Section 27-12-2, and a volunteer authorized to issue a citation
under Section 41-6-19.5 may issue and deliver a citation
requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant
to law if the person had been arrested.
1997
77-7-19.

A p p e a r a n c e r e q u i r e d by c i t a t i o n — Arrest for
failure to a p p e a r — Transfer of c a s e s — Motor
v e h i c l e v i o l a t i o n s — D i s p o s i t i o n of fines a n d
costs.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear
before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before
the time and date specified in the citation unless the uniform
bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or Subsection
77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged.
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner
than five days or later than 14 days following its issuance.
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply
with Section 77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the
court specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may issue
a warrant of arrest.
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or
information issued for violations of Title 41 shall state that the
person receiving the citation or information shall appear
before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either
the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack
of territorial jurisdiction or the disqualification of the judge,
transfer cases to a justice court with territorial jurisdiction or
the district court within the county.
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel serving
the courts shall ensure that all citations for violation of
Title 41 are filed in a court with jurisdiction and venue
and shall refuse to receive citations that should be filed in
another court.
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures imposed or collected for violations of Titie 41, which are filed contrary to
this section shall be paid to the entitled municipality or
county by the state, county, or municipal treasurer who
has received the fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the
court which collected them.
(c) The accounting and remitting of sums due shall be
at the close of the fiscal year of the municipality or county
which has received fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures as a
result of any improperly filed citations.
1996
77-7-20.

S e r v i c e of c i t a t i o n o n d e f e n d a n t — F i l i n g in
c o u r t — C o n t e n t s of c i t a t i o n s .
(1) If a citation is issued pursuant to Section 77-7-18, the
peace officer or public official shall issue one copy to the person
cited and shall within five days file a duplicate copy with the
court specified in the citation.
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under authority of this
chapter shall contain:
(a) the name of the court before which the person is to
appear;
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Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he
shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall
take Care t h a t the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall
Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Sec. 4. [Impeachment.]
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.
ARTICLE HI
[JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT]
Section
1. [Judicial power.]
2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — Trial and
places of trial.]
3. [Treason, proof and punishment.]
S e c t i o n 1. [Judicial power.]
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
S e c . 2.

[Extent of j u d i c i a l p o w e r — S u p r e m e Court —
Trial a n d p l a c e s of trial.]
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two
or more States;—[between a State and Citizens of another
State;]—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
[3.] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed.
S e c . 3. [Treason, proof and p u n i s h m e n t . ]
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.

ARTICLE rVil
[STATE AND TERRITORIAL^
Section
1. [Full faith and credit to records and *
states.]
^
2. [Privileges and immunities
FUe
service.]
3. [Admission of states — Rules and ]
the territory and
States.]
- .^
4. [Guaranty of republican form of gave*'*
invasion.]
S e c t i o n 1. [Full faith a n d credit to'ri
cial p r o c e e d i n g s of states.] ^
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in &L__
public Acts, Records, and judicial ProceedinirS
State. And the Congress may by general LaV
Manner in which such Acts, Records and ]
proved, and the Effect thereof.
S e c . 2.

[Privileges and immunities — ]
j u s t i c e a n d service.]
, -^
[1J The Citizens of each State shall be
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the i
[2.] A person charged in any State with Tre
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, a n d l
another State, shall on Demand of the executive J
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to 1
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. ;*
[3.] No Person held to Service or Labour in one Sfi
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in (
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged 1
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on T
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be <
Sec. 3.

[Admission of s t a t e s — R u l e s and
r e s p e c t i n g t h e territory a n d property^
U n i t e d States.]
[1J New States may be admitted by the Congres^il
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected will
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be forme
Junction of two or more States, or P a r t s of States, w i j ^ ^
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned a s j ~
of the Congress.
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to dispose of a
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terrij^
other Property belonging to the United States; and n o t t |
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejuo^cr
Claims of the United States, or of any particular StateuJ
Sec. 4.

[Guaranty of r e p u b l i c a n form of gover
and against invasion.]
The United States shall guarantee to every State in^s
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall prdt
each of them against Invasion; and on Application o££
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature <
be convened) against domestic Violence.
^-m
ARTICLE V
[AMENDMENT]
[Mode of a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses sb
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Con
tution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-1
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposii
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to

Art. IV, § 4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Jits a*1** Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
fied by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
s or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one
he* other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
ess; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
Tto the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
Sjiy Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
tion of the first Article; and that no State, without its
cnt, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
^

JAMES WILSON,

Gouv MORRIS.

Delaware

GEO: READ,
GUNNING BEDFORD JUN,
JOHN DICKINSON,
RICHARD BASSETT,
JACO: BROOM.

Maryland

JAMES MCHENRY,
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER,
DANL CARROLL.

Virginia

JOHN BLAIR,
JAMES MADISON JR.

North Carolina

WM BLOUNT,
RLCHD DOBBS SPAIGHT,
HU WILLIAMSON.

South Carolina

J . RUTLEDGE,
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,
ABR BALDWIN.

ARTICLE VI
[MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS]

aption of p u b l i c d e b t — S u p r e m e L a w — Oath of
See — R e l i g i o u s t e s t s prohibited.]
| [ l j All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,
Ifore the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid
tggainst the United States under this Constitution, as under
Ithe Confederation.
IK [2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
Iwhich shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
Imade, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
lUnited States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
^Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Jjconstitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary n o t w i t hstanding.
I (3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.
ARTICLE VII
[ADOPTION]
[Ratification — Attestation.]
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between
the States so ratifying the same. Done in Convention by the
unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day
of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the
United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we
have hereunto subscribed our names,
New Hampshire

JOHN LANGDON,
NICHOLAS GILMAN.

Massachusetts

NATHANIEL GORHAM,
RUFUS KING.

Connecticut

WM. SAML. JOHNSON,
ROGER SHERMAN.

New York

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

New Jersey

WIL: LIVINGSTON,
DAVID BREARLEY,
WM. PATERSON,
JONA: DAYTON.

Pennsylvania

B FRANKLIN,
THOMAS MIFFLIN,
ROBT MORRIS,
GEO. CLYMER,
THOS. FITZSIMONS,
JARED INGERSOLL,

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for
their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this
Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should
fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States
which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the
Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the
Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors, should be
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected:
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution
requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should
convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President;
and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with
the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W JACKSON, Secretary.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIII

Section
I [Slavery prohibited ]
2. [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction
gee. 2. [ P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ]
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment ]
3 [Disqualification to hold office ]
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid ]
5 [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Citizenship — D u e p r o c e s s of l a w — Equal
protection.?
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall
taake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
Immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
Sec. 2. [ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to r e d u c e appoint£r
ment.]
v Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi%oal Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
Jteing twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
^States, or m any way abridged, except for participation in
I ' w l h o n , or other crime, the basis of representation therein
\*nall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
i * ^ e citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
' ^enty-one years of age in such State
£ * * , % IDisqu&H&cation to hold
office.}
fpNo person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
jjf Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
L?J" or military, under the United States, or under any State,
|F?o> having previously taken an oath, as a member of ConK ^ s > or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
filfly State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
R e s t a t e , to support the Constitution of the United States,
I S ? " "ave engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
P * » ° r given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But
R v j p e s s may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
Er^disabihty
fegT
[Public d e b t not to b e q u e s t i o n e d — D e b t s of
W+frt
t h e Confederacy a n d c l a i m s n o t to b e paid.]
E g * ^ validity of the public debt of the United States, authoK & Dv law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

Amend. XVIII, § 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave,
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void
S e c . 5. [ P o w e r t o e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify ]
2 [Power to enforce amendment ]
S e c t i o n 1. [Right of c i t i z e n s to v o t e — R a c e or color
n o t t o disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
S e c . 2. [ P o w e r t o e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation
AMENDMENT XVI
( i n c o m e tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
Incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
Census or enumeration
AMENDMENT XVII
(Election of s e n a t o r s . ]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
Vears, and each Senator shall have one vote The electors in
^ach State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
Of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
Ui the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
Writs of election to fill such vacancies Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct
This a m e n d m e n t shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or t e r m of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as p a r t of the Constitution
AMENDMENT XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933 SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 11
Section
1 [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors ]
2 [Concurrent power to enforce amendment ]
3 [Time limit for adoption ]
S e c t i o n 1. [ N a t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n — I n t o x i c a t i n g liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
DC. Congressional a n d Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities a n d Towns
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue a n d Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII.
Forestry
XDC. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XX22L Amendment and Revision
XXTV. Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of th^t
right.
i8&e
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in t h e people; a n d all free
governments a r e founded on their authority for their equ^l
protection a n d benefit, and they have t h e right to alter or
reform their government as t h e public welfare may require.
18&6

Sec. 3 . [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
The State of U t a h is an inseparable part of t h e Federal
Union a n d t h e Constitution of t h e United States is the
supreme law of the land.
18&6

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life a n d liberty, we, t h e people
of Utah, in order to secure a n d perpetuate t h e principles of
'free government, do ordain a n d establish this CONSTITU.
HON.

189$

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent a n d inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in t h e people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote o*hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
II- [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
*12. [Rights of accused persons J
*3. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
*4. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-.
rant.]
*«. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
*6- [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
*7. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
io ^ t t a m d e r — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
* j - (Treason defined — Proof.]
*J- [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
**• [Slavery forbidden.]
."*• [Private property for public use.]
* j - [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
**• [Uniform operation of laws.]
if?' [Rights retained by people.]

Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification
to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The S t a t e
shall m a k e no law respecting an establishment of religion o r
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall b e
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or fo r
any vote a t a n y election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and S t a t ^
nor shall a n y church dominate t h e State or interfere with i t s
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction.,
or for t h e support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to v o t ^
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
I89e
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not b^
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
i89g
Sec. 6. [Right t o bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms fojsecurity and defense of self, family, others, property, or t h e
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not b^
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd s.sx>
Sec. 7. fDue process o f faw. J
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
189ft
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there ifc
substantial evidence to support t h e charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation o r
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence t<3
support t h e new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designate!!
by s t a t u t e a s one for which bail may be denied, if there ifc
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)
[ E x c e s s i v e b a i l a n d fines — C r u e l p u n i s h ments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896

S e c . 14.

[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s f o r b i d d e n -*J*iL
a n c e of w a r r a n t . ]
^ JgHJ
The right of the people to be secure in their persons 1 ^ ;
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 8eii»i
shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue but "tin
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particSS
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thin*
be seized.
vf??

S e c . 9.

S e c . 10. [Trial b y j u r y . ]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c . 11. [ C o u r t s o p e n — R e d r e s s of i n j u r i e s . ]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
1896
S e c . 12. [ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s . ]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
n a t u r e and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
S e c . 13.

[Prosecution by information or indictment —
G r a n d jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

v#
S e c . 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s •—TXJjvt
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel ti
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury; and if iVrfj*
appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as libelous^ tru
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable end
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have thejto
to determine the law and the fact.
-U^
S e c . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — Exception.] I
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases*
absconding debtors.
.r/JSJ
S e c . 17. [ E l e c t i o n s t o b e f r e e — S o l d i e r s voting.] ~JT
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or militar.
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of th
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at tht
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations W b
prescribed by law.
/Jim
«v
j

*

S e c . 18.

[ A t t a i n d e r — E x p o s t f a c t o l a w s — Impairiai
contracts.]
^X
t
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing thf
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
rjm
S e c . 19. [ T r e a s o n d e f i n e d — P r o o f . ]
^
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
18W

M

S e c . 20. [ M i l i t a r y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e civil power.] \%
The military shall be in strict subordination to the cry*1
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered u»
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
M*
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
££
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
V

H

S e c . 2 2 . [ P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use.]
*>
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation.
£7

u\
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
# **
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
S e c . 24. [ U n i f o r m o p e r a t i o n of l a w s . ]
. *#<'
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operatio^r
is^
Sec. 25. [Rights r e t a i n e d b y people.]
L
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to i^PJjjJ
or deny others retained by the people.
^
S e c . 26. [ P r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t o r y a n d p r o h i b i t o
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory •*•«,
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared t 0 **otherwise.
"*
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(4) If the governor disapproves any bill or item of appropriation after the adjournment sine die of any session of the
Legislature, the presiding officer of each house shall poll the
members of t h a t house on the m a t t e r of reconvening the
Legislature. If two-thirds of the members of each house are in
favor of reconvening, the Legislature shall be convened in a
session t h a t shall begin within 60 days after the adjournment
of the session at which the disapproved bill or item of appropriation passed. This session may not exceed five calendar
days and shall be convened at a time set jointly by the
presiding officer of each house solely for the purpose of
reconsidering the bill or item of appropriation disapproved. If
upon reconsideration, the bill or item of appropriation again
passes both houses of the Legislature by a yea and nay vote of
two-thirds of the members elected to each house, the bill shall
become law or the item of appropriation shall take effect on
the original effective date of the law or item of appropriation.
1992

Sec. 9. [Governor m a y nil c e r t a i n v a c a n c i e s . ]
When any State or district office shall become vacant, and
no mode is provided by the Constitution and laws for filling
such vacancy, the Governor shall have the power to fill the
same by granting a commission, which shall expire at the next
election, and upon qualification of the person elected to such
office.

1896

Sec. 10. [Governor's a p p o i n t i v e p o w e r — Vacancies.]
The Governor shall nominate, and by and with consent of
the Senate, appoint all State and district officers whose offices
are established by this Constitution, or which may be created
by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise
provided for. If, during the recess of the Senate, a vacancy
occurs in any State or district office, the Governor shall
appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties thereof
until the next meeting of the Senate, when the Governor shall
nominate some person to fill such office. If the office of
Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer or Attorney General be vacated by death, resignation or otherwise, it
shall be the duty of the Governor to fill the same by appointment, from the same political party of the removed person;
and the appointee shall hold office until a successor shall be
elected and qualified, as provided by law.
1979
S e c . 11.

[Vacancy i n office of G o v e r n o r — D e t e r m i n a t i o n of disability.]
In case of the death of the Governor, impeachment, removal
from office, resignation, or disability to discharge the duties of
the office, or in case of a Governor-elect who fails to take office,
the powers and duties of the Governor shall devolve upon the
Lieutenant Governor until the disability ceases or until the
next general election, when the vacancy shall be filled by
election. If, during a vacancy in the office of Governor, the
Lieutenant Governor resigns, dies, is removed, or becomes
incapable of performing the duties of the office, the President
of the Senate shall act as Governor until the vacancy is filled
or disability ceases. If in this case the President of the Senate
resigns, dies, is removed, or becomes incapable of performing
the duties of the office, the Speaker of the House shall act as
Governor until the vacancy is filled or disability ceases. While
performing the duties of the Governor as provided in this
section, the Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate,
or the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall be
entitled to the salary and emoluments of the Governor, except
in cases of temporary disability.
The disability of the Governor or person acting as Governor
shall be determined by either a written declaration transmitted to the Supreme Court by the Governor stating an inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the office or by a
majority of the Supreme Court on joint request of t h e Presi-
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dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Such determination shall be final and conclusive.
Thereafter, when the Governor transmits to the Supreme
Court a written declaration t h a t no disability exists, the
Governor shall resume the powers and duties of the office
unless the Supreme Court, upon joint request of the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or upon its own initiative, determines t h a t the Governor
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. The
Lieutenant Governor shall then continue to discharge these
powers and duties as acting Governor. The Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under
this section.
1979
Sec. 12.

[Board of P a r d o n s a n d P a r o l e — A p p o i n t m e n t
— P o w e r s a n d p r o c e d u r e s — Governor's powe r s a n d d u t i e s — Legislature's p o w e r s . ]
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The
Governor shall appoint the members of the board with the
consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided
by statute.
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote
and upon other conditions as provided by statute, may
grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons after
convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to regulations as provided by statute.
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be
remitted and a commutation, parole, or pardon may not
be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in
open session, and after previous notice of the time and
place of the hearing has been given.
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the
reasons therefor in each case, and the dissent of any
member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as
provided by statute with all papers used upon the hearing.
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all
cases of convictions for offenses against the state except
treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites or
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
board. At that session, the board shall continue or determine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided in this section.
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may
suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next annual general
session, when the Legislature shall pardon or commute
the sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature
takes no action on the case before adjournment of that
session, the sentence shall be executed.
1992
Sec. 13.

[Repealed.]

1992

Sec. 14. [Duties of L i e u t e n a n t Governor.]
The Lieutenant Governor shall:
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of the
Governor whenever so designated by the Governor;
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by the
Governor; and
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by statute.
1992

Sec. 15. [ D u t i e s of S t a t e A u d i t o r a n d State Treasurer.]
(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post audits of
public accounts except as otherwise provided by this Constitution.
(2) The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of public
moneys.
(3) Each shall perform other duties as provided by statute.
1992

Rule 104
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(b) R e c o r d of offer a n d ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of the
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made,
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.
(c) H e a r i n g of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) P l a i n error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Rule 104. P r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s .
(a) Q u e s t i o n s of a d m i s s i b i l i t y generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
(privileges.
\ (b) R e l e v a n c y c o n d i t i o n e d o n fact. When the relevancy
^bf evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
t h e court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
(c) H e a r i n g of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of
the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an
accused is a witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony b y a c c u s e d . The accused does not, by
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to crossexamination as to other issues in the case.
(e) W e i g h t and credibility. This rule does not limit the
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant
to weight or credibility.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Rule 106. R e m a i n d e r of or r e l a t e d w r i t i n g s o r recorded statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at t h a t time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.
R u l e 201. J u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a d j u d i c a t i v e facts.
(a) S c o p e of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.
(b) K i n d s of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in t h a t it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) W h e n discretionary. A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.

*

(e) O p p o r t u n i t y to b e h e a r d . A party is entitled u ^
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to tJ
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the n ^
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the r e q u e s t j
be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of t a k i n g n o t i c e . Judicial notice may be taken J
any stage of the proceeding.
(g) I n s t r u c t i n g jury. In a civil action or proceeding K
court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any^
anvtJ
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall insftJ
the jury t h a t it may, but is not required to, accept as concha!
any fact judicially noticed.
ARTICLE III. P R E S U M P T I O N S .
R u l e 301. P r e s u m p t i o n s i n g e n e r a l i n civil actions > J
proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwM
provided for by statute or by these rules, a p r e s u m p t j
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burdend
proving t h a t the nonexistence of the presumed fact is mcrg
probable t h a n its existence.
(b) I n c o n s i s t e n t p r e s u m p t i o n s . If presumptions are l y
consistent, the presumption applies t h a t is founded upo*
weightier considerations of policy. If considerations of p o S
are of equal weight neither presumption applies.
R u l e 302. Applicability of federal l a w i n civil actioM
and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumptjp
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense tt
to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is detfjrmined in accordance with federal law.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
A N D ITS LIMITS.
R u l e 401. Definition of "relevant e v i d e n c e . "
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendencyfl
make the existence of any fact t h a t is of consequence to ti*
determination of the action more probable or less probaNfe
t h a n it would be without the evidence.
R u l e 402. R e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y a d m i s s i b l e ^
relevant evidence inadmissible.
'''•/:-?ffg
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otHei*Bj
provided by the Constitution of the United States o ^
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rule
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. EVK
which is not relevant is not admissible.
R u l e 403. E x c l u s i o n of r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e o n grow
prejudice, c o n f u s i o n , or w a s t e of t i m e ^
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its P*??S
value is substantially outweighed by the danger ortfj
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, f
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or ne
presentation of cumulative evidence.
R u l e 404. Character e v i d e n c e n o t a d m i s s i b l e i9<lj§|
conduct; e x c e p t i o n s ; o t h e r crimes* U/9
(a) Character e v i d e n c e generally. Evidence of a J
character or a trait of character is not admissible^
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith 00^3
ticular occasion, except:
--^tn
(1) C h a r a c t e r of a c c u s e d . Evidence of a # g j l
trait of character offered by an accused, or bv t^EJ
ecution to rebut the same;
(2) C h a r a c t e r of v i c t i m . Evidence of a VeT**^f
of character of the victim of the crime offered^
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the

